bartman's blog

OLS keysigning / 2006

bartman

I think this year’s key post-keysigning-party work was the least effort ever. I wanted to write down the procedure for anyone interested.

First a few assumptions:

A tool that make sthings easier is caff and gpg-agent.

apt-get install keysigning-party gnupg-agent.

Install it and configure as per: “Running caff with gpg-agent. Also, run the agent:

    eval `gpg-agent --daemon`

Now prepare a list of keys you want to sign. It needs to contain at least the fingerprints of all the keys that are in the event’s file whose sha1 sum was validated. I did this by opening up vim with two buffers and copying the keys whose owners I identified at the event…

    vim -o tosign fingerprints.txt

Next, fetch all the keys:

    grep 'fingerprint = ' tosign | cut -d = -f 2 | cut -d ' ' -f 9- | tr -d ' ' | uniq > tosign.keys
    cat tosign.keys | xargs gpg --recv-keys 

Yes, caff usually does this for you, but the next step is to make sure that the keys you got match the fingerprint. We do this in two cheezy shell hacks.

First get the fingerprints of the keys we downloaded:

    for key in `cat tosign.keys` ; do gpg --fingerprint $key ; done | grep 'fingerprint = ' | uniq > tosign.fprs

Then make sure that each of the fingerprints is in the tosign file.

    cat tosign.fprs | tr ' ' . | while read line ; do if ! ( grep -q $fprs tosign ) ; then echo -e "$fprs\n... not in 'tosign' file!" >&2 ; fi ; done

If you don’t get any error reports then you can go ahead and sign everything…

    caff -u FF3459D52289688F `cat tosign.keys`

(you would replace the FF3459D52289688F with your key ID).

And as a final step I verify the fingerprints shows by gpg against the sheet given to me at the event. But I cannot trust these fingerprints anyways, as they were printed out by the organizers.

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